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CRIMINAL TRIALS AND APPEALS: A 
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE NEW 
ZEALAND MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM 
AND THE CIVILIAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Christopher Corns* 
This article sets out the laws relating to criminal trials conducted in the Court Martial of New Zealand 
and relating to appeals from that Court to the Court Martial Appeal Court and compares those laws 
to the equivalent laws relating to criminal trials and appeals in the civilian system. The purpose of 
this article is to identify the legal and ideological similarities and differences between the two systems, 
and where there are differences, to suggest possible explanations. It is argued in this article that, 
whilst there remain significant differences between the laws governing the military and civilian 
systems, a clear pattern of "convergence" or "alignment" can be identified whereby the military 
system is adopting (and adapting) more and more features of the civilian laws in terms of substantive 
rights, procedure and values. Recent statutory reforms in 2018 to the military justice system are also 
included. This process of alignment is likely to continue in the future. Having said this, the 
fundamental differences between the two systems are also likely to remain for some time as each 
system serves different needs. 
I INTRODUCTION 
In New Zealand, as in other Commonwealth countries, there are two fundamental systems for the 
administration of criminal justice.1 The first, and most high-profile, is the civilian system. In very 
broad terms, the civilian system is based upon a range of criminal offences which apply to all citizens 
  
*  LLB, University of Melbourne, BA (Hons), University of Melbourne, LLM, Monash University, PhD, 
Monash University, Barrister and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Victoria; and Honorary Associate 
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1  This article is based on research for ch 8 of Christopher Corns and Douglas Ewan "Appeals from the Court 
Martial of New Zealand to the Court Martial Appeal Court" in Criminal Appeals and Reviews in New Zealand 
(Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2019). I am indebted to Judge Advocate General Kevin Riordan, Christopher 
Griggs, Barrister and Thomas Hague, Assistant Director of the New Zealand Defence Force Legal Services, 
for their assistance with this research. 
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of New Zealand, where a breach of any of those offences will usually be dealt with in the relevant 
court.2 If there is to be a trial, the trial is presided over by a judge only or the trial is conducted as a 
judge and jury trial – depending upon the category of offence involved.3 Key statutes such as the 
Criminal Procedure Act 2011, the Evidence Act 2006 and the Sentencing Act 2002 apply.4 Appeals 
from these courts are to the "first appeal court".5 Further appeals are also possible with leave of the 
relevant appeal court.6 Prosecutions are, in general, conducted by Crown Solicitors, although private 
prosecutions are recognised.7 
The second system is the criminal justice system administered by, and within, the New Zealand 
Defence Force: the "military justice system".8 The military justice system consists of (a) the summary 
disposition of the less serious offences;9 and (b) the Court Martial dealing with the more serious 
offences. This article only concerns proceedings by Court Martial and appeals from that Court. 
In broad terms, the military justice system is based upon a range of criminal offences which can 
apply to persons who are subject to the Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971 (AFDA) (service 
  
2  Investigators and prosecutors do however have a discretion to divert known offenders in particular 
circumstances, or to grant an immunity from prosecution in appropriate cases: see Criminal Procedure Act 
2011, s 148. 
3  Category 1 and 2 offences are dealt with by a judge-alone trial. A defendant has the right to elect for a jury 
trial if he or she is charged with a category 3 offence: Criminal Procedure Act, s 50. Category 4 offences are 
dealt with in the High Court by jury trial if the defendant pleads not guilty. 
4  A range of other Acts can of course also apply. Examples include the Bail Act 2000, the Criminal Disclosure 
Act 2008, the Parole Act 2002 and the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003. The 
Criminal Procedure Rules 2012 and the Court of Appeal (Criminal) Rules 2001 are also important. 
5  The first appeal court depends upon which court was the court at first instance. For example, if the defendant 
is convicted in the District Court following a judge-alone trial, the first appeal court (for a conviction or 
sentence appeal) is the High Court: Criminal Procedure Act, s 230(b). If the defendant is convicted in the 
District Court following a jury trial, the first appeal court (for a conviction or sentence appeal) is either the 
Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court: Criminal Procedure Act, s 230(b)(i). 
6  For example, if the offender unsuccessfully appealed conviction to the High Court, then he or she can apply 
for leave to appeal the decision of the High Court to either the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court: Criminal 
Procedure Act, s 238(b). 
7  Criminal Procedure Act, s 10. 
8  The Defence Force refers to the Armed Forces and the civil staff within the Defence Force: Defence Act 1990, 
s 11(1). The Armed Forces consist of the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force collectively, but does not include 
any part of the cadet forces: Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971 (AFDA), s 2.  
9  Summary offences are dealt with by the commanding officer of the accused person: see Chris Griggs "A New 
Military Justice System for New Zealand" (2006) 45 Military Law and the Law of War Review 287 at 291–
301. 
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offences).10 In addition, persons who are subject to the AFDA can also be charged with an offence 
which would be an offence under a civilian statute.11 All of these offences, as well as the investigatory 
and adjudication procedures, are set out in the AFDA.12 The AFDA applies mainly to full-time 
members of the New Zealand Armed Forces but can, in limited circumstances, also apply to a range 
of other persons, including some civilians, as discussed below. 
A breach of any of these offences can be dealt with in the Court Martial of New Zealand.13 If 
there is to be a trial, the trial is presided over by a judge, along with either three or five military 
members, depending upon the seniority of the accused and the seriousness of the offence.14 Appeals 
from the Court Martial are to the New Zealand Court Martial Appeal Court (CMAC).  
A different set of statutes apply to military trials and appeals. The key statutes are the AFDA, the 
Court Martial Act 2007 (CMA), the Court Martial Appeals Act 1953 (CMAA), the Armed Forces 
Discipline Rules of Procedure 2008, the Armed Forces Discipline Regulations 2008 and the Court 
Martial Appeal Court Rules 2008. These statutes provide the overall legislative framework for the 
administration of criminal justice in the military system. 
A number of vital elements or principles underpin the military justice system. These are the need 
to maintain discipline, consistency in all strategic environments, portability, expedition, fairness, 
  
10  These service offences are found in the AFDA pt 2, ss 23–73. Many of these offences have a very long 
heritage, for example, mutiny (s 32), cowardly behaviour (s 28), spying (s 26), drunkenness (s 34), disobeying 
a lawful command (s 38) and desertion (s 47).    
11  Pursuant to s 74(1) of the AFDA. Common examples are offences under the Crimes Act 1961 and the Misuse 
of Drugs Act 1975. For these offences, and for offences listed in the AFDA, a commanding officer must first 
record a "well founded" allegation in the form of a charge to be investigated in the prescribed manner, or 
cause the allegation to be referred to the appropriate civil authority for investigation: AFDA, s 102(1). The 
Director of Military Prosecutions subsequently decides if the accused is to be committed for trial in the Court 
Martial, and, if so, upon what charges, and prepares and certifies the charge sheet. The Director then gives a 
copy of the charge sheet to the accused and lays the charge sheet before the Registrar of the Court Martial: 
AFDA, s 101F. For some civilian offences there therefore exists concurrent jurisdiction between the military 
jurisdiction and the civilian system. For details of how the concurrent jurisdiction is resolved, see New 
Zealand Defence Force Manual of Armed Forces Law Volume 1: Commander's Handbook on Military Law 
(DM 69 (2 ed)) at [2.7.3]. 
12  Manual of Armed Forces Law Volume 1: Commander's Handbook on Military Law, above n 11, sets out the 
investigatory, prosecutorial, and appellate procedures for summary offences in ch 7; and New Zealand 
Defence Force Manual of Armed Forces Law Volume 2: Commander's Handbook on Military Law (DM 69 
(2 ed)) sets out the investigatory, prosecutorial, and appellate procedures for offences dealt with by the Court 
Martial at [1.1]–[1.8]. 
13  Court Martial Act 2007 (CMA), s 36, referring to AFDA, s 78.   
14  To be a member of a Court Martial, the officer must be a member of the Armed Forces, have served in the 
Forces for a period of more than three years, and not be disqualified under s 23 of the Act: CMA, s 22. 
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efficiency and simplicity.15 These elements have arisen from the practical realities of operational 
conflict and have informed military justice procedures and rights since the advent of courts martial. 
Whilst the civilian and military justice systems have been operating in parallel since the 
colonisation of New Zealand, it would appear that, as a general proposition, less is known about the 
military justice system by the general public and probably civilian lawyers, than is known about its 
civil counterpart.  
However, for the approximately 11,500 members of the Armed Forces,16 the right to a fair trial 
and the right to appeal a conviction, sentence, ruling, or other decision of the trial court, is just as 
important as for their civilian counterparts, particularly where the offence involved carries a sentence 
of life imprisonment.  
In general, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) applies equally to all New 
Zealand citizens regardless of whether they are in the military or not. However, as will be seen in the 
discussion below, not all provisions in the NZBORA will apply in exactly the same manner for 
military members. This is because, in joining the Defence Force, members do not lose their rights 
under the NZBORA, but they do take on additional responsibilities and duties (which their civilian 
counterparts do not),17 and those additional responsibilities affect the way the NZBORA applies to 
them. The requirement to maintain discipline in the Defence Force can also influence the way in which 
the NZBORA applies to members of the Defence Force. 
In order to "open up" discussion concerning the New Zealand military justice system, this article 
sets out specific laws in respect of criminal trials conducted in the Court Martial, and appeals to the 
CMAC, and compares those laws to the equivalent laws in respect of criminal trials and appeals in 
the civilian system. The purpose of the article is to identify the similarities and differences between 
the two systems and, where there are differences, to suggest explanations.  This comparative analysis 
also illuminates the ways in which criminal appeal systems in general evolve over time to meet the 
needs of the institutions and parties involved. 
A comparative analysis is also useful because both the military and civilian criminal justice 
systems have undergone major reforms over the last decade in order to consolidate and modernise old 
laws.18 An important driver of these reforms for both systems has been the requirement that both 
  
15  Referred to by the Minister of Defence, the Hon Phil Goff, during the first reading speech of the Armed Forces 
Law Reform Bill 2007 (108–10): see (15 March 2007) 637 NZPD 8064–8065. Also see Griggs, above n 9, at 
291. 
16  New Zealand Defence Force Annual Report: For the year ended 30 June 2017 at 23. 
17  Froggatt v R (1992) 9 CRNZ 181 (CMAC) at 20. 
18  In 2002, a military justice review commenced within the New Zealand Defence Force: see Griggs, above n 9, 
at 291. As a consequence of the 2002 review, the Armed Forces Law Reform Bill introduced significant 
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systems are human rights compliant, particularly after the enactment of the NZBORA. The rights of 
crime victims have also been a focus. 
The Military Justice Legislation Amendment Act 2018 introduced a number of reforms which 
came into effect on 30 November 2018.19 These are discussed below. 
As stated, one key feature of all military laws pertaining to trials, sentencing and appeals, is the 
quintessential need for discipline within the Armed Forces. In a sense, the military operates upon an 
assumption that all members will obey lawful orders of a superior officer, and this assumption is 
carried through into legal procedures and legal rights. The requirement of discipline is a core 
imperative amongst other values, beliefs and customs within the military. These values and beliefs 
are not generally found in the civilian system.   
It is argued in this article that whilst a clear pattern of "convergence" or "alignment" between the 
military justice system and the civilian justice system can be identified, it is most unlikely that the 
fundamental features of the military justice system will change in the near future. This convergence 
consists of the military system adopting (and adapting) features of the civilian system in terms of 
substantive rights, procedure and underlying values. The convergence is more marked in the military 
appellate system than in the trial system.   
Part I of the article sets out the laws governing the Court Martial (in comparison to civilian courts) 
and Part II sets out the laws governing appeals from the Court Martial to the CMAC and other forms 
of review (in comparison to civilian appeal courts). 
II PART I 
A The New Zealand Court Martial 
The contemporary Court Martial is established by s 8(1) of the CMA. The Court Martial is a 
single, permanent court of record. Prior to 2007, the system of courts martial was very much ad hoc, 
based on old rules and procedures, many from the 19th century.20 The Court Martial as a whole 
  
reforms in 2007. For the purposes of this article, in the civilian system the Criminal Procedure Act, the Senior 
Courts Act 2016 and the Court Matters Act 2018 are the most significant reforms. 
19  The main reforms introduced by the Military Justice Legislation Amendment Act 2018 are (in summary): the 
expansion of the rights of victims of crime; the prosecution's right to object to appointment of a military 
member; abolition of the legal burden of proof on accused; and the expansion of appeal rights in respect of 
unfitness to stand trial.  
20  Prior to 2007, courts martial procedures were largely governed by pt 6 of the AFDA. Part 6 was repealed by 
s 86 of the CMA. The military use of courts martial can be traced back to at least the 12th century in England. 
There are records of the Romans taking a military tribunal along with the army into battle: see Gordon Hook 
"The Evolution of New Zealand Military Tribunals: From Prototype to Paradigm" [2003] New Zealand 
Armed Forces Law Review 36. The early use of courts martial was based on the need for speedy and efficient 
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consists of one judge who is the Chief Judge of the Court Martial and at least six other judges. The 
judges are civilian judges.21 As civilian judges, they enhance independence in trial decision-making, 
but may lack deep understanding of the military ethos, beliefs and customs. For this reason it is 
important that the Court also consist of military members as the fact finders. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the Court Martial has jurisdiction in respect of service offences 
as well as civilian offences. Based on the seriousness of these offences, the Court Martial has the 
criminal jurisdiction equivalent to that of the District Court and the High Court.22   
B Jurisdiction of the Court Martial 
1 Service offences 
Section 36(1) of the CMA states that the Court has the jurisdiction conferred by s 78 of the AFDA. 
Section 78 states: 
Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Court Martial has jurisdiction to try any charge against a person 
subject to this Act in respect of an offence against this Act, whether committed in New Zealand or 
elsewhere. 
Section 78 refers to offences against the AFDA. Part 2 of the Act headed "[o]ffences" sets out 11 
categories of offences. Most of these offences are specifically service offences or service related 
offences relating to the fundamental duties of service members. Examples include "[o]ffences 
involving treachery, cowardice, and looting" (e.g. aiding the enemy,23 cowardly behaviour,24 
spying25 and looting.26 Other examples are "[o]ffences involving mutiny" (e.g. mutiny)27 and 
"[d]esertion, absence and malingering".28 These could be described as the "core" offences dealt with 
  
despatch of proceedings, not because of any disdain for formal procedures, but simply as a consequence of 
the exigencies of armed conflict.  
21  Judges are appointed from District Court Judges or can be a person who has held a practising certificate as a 
barrister or solicitor of the High Court for at least seven years: CMA, s 11(1). A District Court Judge appointed 
to the Court Martial can sit in the Court Martial as a District Court Judge under s 11(2).  
22  Most of the offences within the jurisdiction of the Court Martial are equivalent to category 3 or 4 offences, 
based on the available maximum penalty.  
23  Section 23. 
24  Section 28. 
25  Section 26. 
26  Section 31. 
27  Section 32. 
28  Section 47. 
 A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE NEW ZEALAND MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE CIVILIAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 485 
by the Court and each has a long military history. Any person who is "subject to this Act" could be 
tried for these offences. 
Note the alleged offence can occur anywhere in New Zealand and anywhere in the world: the 
AFDA has extra-territorial jurisdiction.29  
2 Civilian offences 
Another category of offences in the AFDA which comes within s 78 are offences covered by s 74. 
Section 74, headed "[o]ffences against the civil law of New Zealand" states: 
Every person subject to this Act commits an offence against this section who, whether in New Zealand or 
elsewhere, does or omits any act which would, if done or omitted in New Zealand, be an offence against 
any Act other than this Act (in this section referred to as a civil offence). 
Again, s 74 applies to an alleged offence whether committed in New Zealand or anywhere in the 
world. Accordingly, offences under civilian statutes (such as the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 or the 
Crimes Act 1961) can be laid in the Court Martial and dealt with as if they were military offences. In 
a sense, these "civilian" offences become military offences because they are committed by a service 
member.  
Whilst these civilian offences may have concurrent jurisdiction with military and civilian courts, 
some civilian offences are considered so serious that it is more appropriate for them to be dealt with 
in a civilian court. For example, except with the consent of the Attorney-General, the Court Martial 
has no jurisdiction in respect of treason, murder, manslaughter, sexual violation or bigamy committed 
in New Zealand.30  
The maximum sentence for service offences varies from life imprisonment31 to six months 
imprisonment.32 Some of the offences are equivalent to certain category 4 offences listed in the 
Criminal Procedure Act.33 This means the jurisdiction of the Court Martial is analogous to the 
jurisdiction of the District Court and the High Court.  
C Other Matters Within Jurisdiction 
Section 36(2) of the CMA also states that the Court Martial must sit to hear and determine: 
  
29  Section 4. 
30  AFDA, s 74(4). 
31  For example aiding the enemy (s 23), spying in ships or establishments abroad (s 26), cowardly behaviour (s 
28) and mutiny (s 31). 
32  For example avoidance of duty (s 49), being in possession of alcohol in a ship, establishment, camp, or base 
(s 52) and false statements on appointment or enlistment (s 53). 
33  For example, treason: see Criminal Procedure Act, sch 1. 
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• every charge laid before the Registrar by the Director of Military Prosecutions; 
• every application by the Director of Military Prosecutions under s 63(2) (i.e. bringing an 
offender before the court for sentence); and 
• every other application made to the Court (e.g. an application for bail). 
D Who is Subject to the Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971? 
Only persons who are subject to the AFDA can be charged and tried in the Court Martial. The 
categories of persons who are subject to the Act are very extensive and close reading of the relevant 
sections is required.34 For the purposes of this article, the following persons are subject to the AFDA: 
• All officers of the Navy, Army, or Air Force (including officers of the Reserves and 
Territorial Forces) (s 6); 
• Other ranks of the regular forces (s 6); 
• A member of the New Zealand Armed Forces temporarily attached to the forces of another 
country or who is a member of a United Nations force (s 8); 
• A member of the Armed Forces of another country, temporarily attached to the Armed Forces 
of New Zealand (s 9); 
• Volunteers, during their period of service, training or exercise (s 10); 
• Members of the armed forces of another country undergoing training in the New Zealand 
Armed Forces (s 11); 
• Prisoners of war, subject to the Geneva Convention and the exemptions listed in s 12(2); 
• A person charged under s 26 or s 27 (spying), until the charge is finalised (s 13); 
• Passengers in any ship, aircraft or vehicle of the New Zealand Armed Forces, in New Zealand 
or elsewhere "to such an extent as may be prescribed" (s 15); 
• Civilians employed by, or accompanying, any New Zealand force on active service "while 
so employed or while accompanying the force" (s 16); 
• A member of the Armed Forces sentenced to imprisonment or detention and dismissed from 
the force, until the sentence is served (s 17); 
• A person who was a member of the Armed Forces but has ceased to be subject to the Act, 
and is charged with an offence alleged to have been committed when he or she was a member 
of the Armed Forces, until the charge is disposed of (s 18); and  
• Civilians serving outside New Zealand, in a capacity connected with the Armed Forces as 
specified in Defence Force Orders. 
  
34  The categories are set out in the AFDA pt 1, ss 6–22 and sch 1. Time limitations for charging a person can 
apply under s 20 and double jeopardy principles apply under ss 21 and 22. 
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E Role of the Director of Military Prosecutions 
The office of Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP) performs a crucial role in the military 
justice system.35 The DMP is analogous to the civil role of a Crown Solicitor in New Zealand, or the 
role of the Director of Public Prosecutions in those commonwealth jurisdictions where the office of 
Director of Public Prosecutions is recognised.36 The DMP is responsible for deciding whether to place 
the accused on trial, and, if they decide to do so, responsible for deciding the nature of the charges, 
laying the charges before the Registrar of the Court Martial and appointing a prosecutor.37 
Under the new s 198C of the AFDA (inserted on 30 November 2018) the DMP must ensure that 
victims of specified offences are accorded the rights set out in the new pt 10A of the Act. 
The DMP shares the same type and degree of independence in office as a Crown Solicitor. For 
example, the DMP is not subject to the control of the Minister of Defence in the performance of his 
or her role.38 This ensures the DMP is not influenced by political considerations in the exercise of his 
or her discretionary powers. Further, the DMP is not under the command of any superior officer within 
the Armed Forces.39 However, the DMP must be accountable in some way for the performance of his 
or her functions and one way this is achieved is through the provision of an annual report to the 
Solicitor-General.40  
Further, s 101K(1) of the AFDA provides:41 
In performing functions or duties, or exercising powers, imposed or conferred by this Act, by the Court 
Martial Act 2007, or by the Court Martial Appeals Act 1953, the Director of Military Prosecutions must 
  
35  The position of Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP) was created in 2007 as part of the broader reforms 
to military justice: see Griggs, above n 9, at 309. The position of DMP creates a clear separation between 
investigative functions and prosecutorial functions and a clear separation between Ministerial or executive 
government decision-making and prosecutorial decision-making. The requirement of prosecutorial 
independence is crucial in this setting. 
36  In all Australian jurisdictions, the position of Director of Public Prosecutions is recognised: see Christopher 
Corns Public Prosecutions in Australia: Law, Policy and Practice (Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2014) at 19.  
37  CMA, s 101F. The DMP can also decide if separate trials will be held and can order a stay of proceedings. 
See Armed Forces Discipline Regulations 2008, r 62 (drawing charges) and r 122 (charge withdrawal). 
38  AFDA, s 101I(a). 
39  AFDA, s 101I(b) 
40  AFDA, s 101J. 
41  The DMP is not obliged to comply with s 101K(1) if he or she thinks to do so would be inconsistent with any 
provisions of the AFDA, the CMA, or the CMAA: AFDA, s 101K(2). The precise scope of the phrase "general 
supervision" is unclear but it seems unlikely the Solicitor-General could or would direct the DMP in respect 
to a particular case or class of cases. The Solicitor-General is also required to act in an independent and 
impartial manner. 
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act under the general supervision of the Solicitor-General in the same manner and to the same extent as a 
Crown Solicitor.  
Through this mechanism, the Solicitor-General is responsible to Parliament (and ultimately to the 
public) for the overall work of the DMP, and hence for the overall prosecution system within the 
Defence Force. 
F The Court Martial Trial 
In 2009 the system of courts martial in New Zealand underwent significant reforms with the 
jettisoning of a number of old procedures and the introduction of more modern approaches based on 
civilian trial and appeal practices.42  
When the Court Martial sits to conduct a trial, it sits as a division of one judge.43 A Court Martial 
consists of a presiding judge, along with a number of military officers as "members" to act as fact 
finders. The number of fact finders depends upon the rank of the accused and the seriousness of the 
offence.44 For serious offences, five military members must be appointed and, in other cases, three 
military members are appointed. In a civilian trial, the jury is usually 12 members although the Court 
can, in prescribed circumstances, sit with fewer than 10 members.45 Unlike civilian trials, the accused 
cannot "opt in" or "opt out" of a jury trial: judge-alone trials are not recognised. 
Section 24(e) of the NZBORA specifically excludes the right to a trial by jury for "an offence 
under military law tried before a military tribunal". The military members in a Court Martial are thus 
  
42  Armed Forces Law Reform Bill. Some of the old procedures which have been abandoned included: a majority 
vote for a finding of guilt or innocence (AFDA, s 133); and the power of the court to suspend a range of 
sentences (AFDA, s 138). A key driver of these reforms was the enactment of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 (NZBORA).  
43  CMA, s 9(1). 
44  If the accused is an officer and the offence is a "serious offence", then five military members are appointed 
and if not, three military officers are appointed: CMA, s 24. A serious offence means an offence which carries 
a maximum sentence of life imprisonment or a term of imprisonment of 20 years or more: CMA, s 21(1)(b). 
Where the accused is a rating, soldier, or airman, the Registrar may assign, if the proceedings relate to a 
serious offence, five officers, or four officers and a warrant officer, or three officers and two warrant officers: 
CMA, s 24(2). In any other case the Registrar may assign three officers or two officers and one warrant officer: 
CMA, s 24(2)(b). It is preferable if the rank of the military members reflects the rank of the accused and the 
seriousness of the offence: CMA, s 24(3). For the constitution of courts martial prior to the 1950s see "Courts-
Martial" [1941] NZLJ 25. 
45  Juries Act 1981, s 22(1)(a). The Juries Act does not state a minimum number of jurors. 
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not equivalent to a civilian jury. A Court Martial is a sui generis legal institution, discussed below.46 
A civilian jury is simply not suited for a Court Martial:47 
The different nature of the judges of fact in a military trial as compared with a civilian trial is grounded in 
the different underlying philosophy of military justice and the practical requirements of military 
operations. The goal of the military justice system is the maintenance of discipline in the armed forces. 
This is a command responsibility. It therefore calls for the exercise of judgment by officers who are trained 
and experienced in the exercise of command and its concomitant duty to maintain discipline. 
The role of the military members is one of the most significant and fundamental differences between 
the court martial and a civilian trial.48 
The requirement that the fact finders be independent is reinforced by a number of provisions in 
the CMA. Section 23 of the Act sets out the circumstances where a military member is disqualified 
from sitting.49 Further, similar to a civilian jury, the accused can object to the appointment of specific 
members, but only on the basis that the proposed member may not be impartial or is not qualified to 
sit.50 This is a far more limited right to challenge compared to a civilian jury where the accused (and 
the prosecution) can challenge four jurors without cause,51 and can challenge an unlimited number of 
potential jurors for cause (i.e. the person is not impartial or is unable to act effectively).52  
One of the reforms introduced by s 28 of the Military Justice Legislation Amendment Act was to 
give the prosecutor a right to object to the appointment of a military member.  
The military members can ask questions during the proceedings to clarify any matters, including 
questioning the accused if he or she gives evidence.53 This is a more expansive right than the 
  
46  Griggs, above n 9, at 306; and R v Sargison (1972) 1 NZCMAR 51 (CMAC) at 55. 
47  Griggs, above n 9, at 306. 
48  R v Sargison, above n 46. In the civilian system the role of the jury has long been considered vital, not just to 
achieve a fair trial, but more broadly, a key mechanism constituting a free and democratic society: see for 
example Patrick Devlin Trial by Jury (revised ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1965).  
49  These include where the officer was (a) the commanding officer of the accused between the date of charge 
and the trial; (b) the prosecutor or a witness; or (c) has investigated the charge. By comparison, under s 7 of 
the Juries Act, a person is disqualified from sitting as a juror if he or she has (at any time) been sentenced to 
imprisonment for life; or for a term of three years or more; or (within the last three months) to home detention 
of more than three months.  
50  CMA, s 27(1); and Armed Forces Discipline Rules of Procedure, r 63(2). Under s 25(a) of the NZBORA an 
accused has a right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial court. This includes an 
independent and impartial jury. 
51  Juries Act, s 24. 
52  Juries Act s 25. 
53  Armed Forces Discipline Regulations, r 103(1)(b). 
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analogous right of civilian jurors who can only ask a question through the trial judge who can 
reformulate the question or simply prohibit the question being asked.54 
As with a civilian trial, the Court Martial must sit in open court, in the presence of the accused, 
and can sit in any place in New Zealand, or indeed, the world.55 To this extent the CMA has extra-
territorial jurisdiction, as does the AFDA.56 The Judge can, however, order the Court to be closed in 
specified circumstances,57 and the accused can be removed in specified circumstances.58 The accused 
can be represented by a lawyer or by a defender.59 
The Judge can rule on any question of law that arises during or before the trial.60 The Judge can 
also rule on a question of law before the military members are appointed.61 The range of questions of 
law that the Judge can rule on is very extensive and includes the admissibility of evidence, a 
submission of no case to answer, severance of trials and the fitness of the accused to stand trial.62 
  
54  Evidence Act 2006, s 101. 
55  CMA, s 37(1). In criminal proceedings the general principle is that the court is open to the public: Criminal 
Procedure Act, s 196(1). The defendant has a right to be present at all hearings but the court has power to 
exclude the defendant if he or she becomes disruptive: Criminal Procedure Act, s 117. 
56  As stated above, the provisions of the AFDA can apply to persons outside New Zealand. Section 4 states 
"[t]his Act applies to all acts done or omitted whether in New Zealand or elsewhere." See also Armed Forces 
Discipline Rules of Procedure, r 5(b)(c). Civilian courts generally exercise criminal jurisdiction in respect to 
offences committed within New Zealand but if a statute permits, a court can exercise jurisdiction in respect 
to an act (or omission) which has occurred outside of New Zealand: see for example Walsh v R [2007] 2 
NZLR 109 (SC); and the Crimes Act, s 8. 
57  For example, the court is closed whilst the judge sits alone to determine a question of law, or the military 
members deliberate (CMA, s 38(1)). Under ss 39–43 of the CMA the judge can limit the scope of open court. 
58  CMA, s 37(2). A defendant in civilian proceedings can also be removed if he or she disrupts the proceedings: 
Criminal Procedure Act, s 117(2). 
59  CMA, s 68. A "defender" is a member of the Armed Forces who undertakes the defence of the accused: Armed 
Forces Discipline Rules of Procedure, r 3. See Armed Forces Discipline Rules of Procedure, r 69–70 (rights 
of counsel); r 64–65 (access to legal representation); and r 15(1)(e) (legal aid). Payment of legal fees is made 
pursuant to pt 2 of the Armed Forces Discipline Regulations. In civilian proceedings the defendant has a right 
to a fair trial and the trial could be unfair if the defendant lacked legal representation: R v Condon [2006] 
NZSC 62, [2007] 1 NZLR 300. NZBORA, s 24(c)(f) recognises a right of persons charged to consult and 
instruct a lawyer, but does not recognise a right to a lawyer at trial at public expense: R v Condon; and Fahey 
v R [2017] NZCA 596, [2018] 2 NZLR 392.  
60  CMA, s 44(1). See Armed Forces Discipline Rules of Procedure, r 74 (military members not permitted to see 
the ruling). 
61  CMA, s 44(2) 
62  CMA, s 44(4). 
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These are the same powers that a civilian judge possesses.63 Arguably, where a Court Martial 
Judge determines a question of law prior to the appointment of the military members, this is analogous 
to a "pre-trial" ruling recognised in the Criminal Procedure Act.64 
The decision of the Court Martial Judge (or a civilian judge in the civilian context) to admit crucial 
prosecution evidence may well persuade the accused to plead guilty. Conversely, the decision to 
exclude crucial prosecution evidence may well persuade the prosecution to abandon the prosecution.   
A party to the proceedings can appeal any of these rulings.65 This is a particularly important right 
for the prosecution because it enables them to challenge on appeal a ruling which could otherwise 
terminate the prosecution case (terminatory rulings). If the prosecution is successful on the appeal 
then the trial will resume in the normal way, whereas in the absence of such an appeal right, the 
prosecution would (or could) fail. 
The Court Martial Judge can call or recall any witness that he or she considers should be 
questioned on any matter that the Judge thinks requires clarification.66 This is not a feature of the civil 
criminal trial but is found in European "inquisitorial" systems. Clearly, this gives the Judge, rather 
than the parties, significant power over the course of the trial. 
Identical to a civilian trial, at the conclusion of the prosecution case, the Judge can rule on a no 
case submission.67 At the conclusion of the whole case the Judge sums up the evidence and directs 
the members on the applicable law.68 
G Rules of Procedure 
The Criminal Procedure Act does not apply to proceedings under the AFDA (except as expressly 
provided) nor to proceedings on appeal from decisions under the Act.69 The only part of the Criminal 
  
63  Under various provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, the judge can rule on questions of law e.g. ss 78, 79, 
80, 101 and 109. Sections 215 and 217 of the Act set out the range of pre-trial rulings that can be appealed, 
with leave. 
64  Criminal Procedure Act, ss 215 and 217. 
65  CMAA, s 7. 
66  CMA, ss 29(4) and 45. 
67  Armed Forces Discipline Rules of Procedure, rr 101–102.  
68  Armed Forces Discipline Rules of Procedure, r 107. 
69  Criminal Procedure Act, s 7(2). It is not surprising that the Criminal Procedure Act does not apply to the 
military system as the Act is premised on prosecutions being conducted by Crown Solicitors, and in specific 
civilian courts. Further, appeals from those civilian courts are to other civilian courts pursuant to a complex 
arrangement of appeal paths. 
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Procedure Act that explicitly applies to trials in the Court Martial is sub-pt 3 of pt 5, which refers to 
public access to court proceedings and restrictions on publishing.70 
The Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003 also "does not apply to 
proceedings under the Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971, or to proceedings on appeal from any 
decision under that Act".71 Nevertheless, under the AFDA the Court has the same jurisdiction as 
prescribed in the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act to determine that a defendant 
is not fit to stand trial, or was insane at the time of the offence.72 The same type of procedures 
contained in the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act will apply in the Court Martial.  
The Military Justice Legislation Amendment Act introduced a new s 187A into pt 10 of the AFDA 
(effective from 30 November 2018) whereby the Court Martial must act through the Judge alone in 
dealing with mentally impaired persons, including determining fitness to plead.  
The Bail Act 2000 does not directly apply although some provisions in that Act may be relevant.73 
Similarly, the Criminal Disclosure Act 2008 does not apply to Court Martial proceedings.74 
H Rules of Evidence 
The Evidence Act does not itself state whether it applies to proceedings in the Court Martial. 
However, importantly, s 71(1) of the CMA states: 
The rules of evidence that apply in the High Court for criminal proceedings (including the rules of 
evidence contained in the Evidence Act 2006 and in any other enactment containing any rule of evidence) 
are the rules of evidence to be followed in proceedings of the Court Martial. 
Section 71(1) is important because, in general, it gives the accused the same rights as applicable in a 
civilian court in respect of key issues such as the admissibility of evidence and warnings to the fact-
finders. The privilege against self-incrimination also applies. However, ss 72–74 of the CMA limit 
the general application of rules of evidence in respect to matters that pertain specifically to the 
military.75  
  
70  AFDA, s 145. 
71  Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003, s 5(2). 
72  AFDA, pt 10, ss 187–198. 
73  For example, under s 49(4)(a) of the CMA some provisions of the Bail Act must be taken into account (eg  
s 8(1)(3)) and under s 50(4)(b) of the CMA), other provisions in the Bail Act may be taken into account (eg 
ss 8(2) and 14(3)).   
74  Criminal Disclosure Act, s 6. 
75  That is, ss 72–74 sets out various rules which permit proof of certain acts through the use of specified 
documents (eg attestation papers, letters from commanding officers, entry into military records and 
certificates). 
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It therefore appears clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act will apply to proceedings in the 
Court Martial, unless exempted or modified by the CMA.76 Specifically, the provisions of the 
Evidence Act that relate to a jury trial can apply (to the extent they are applicable and can be modified) 
to proceedings of the Court Martial that involve military members.77 This is an important provision 
as it gives the accused the same benefits as a civilian accused, in terms of mandatory jury warnings, 
the requirements of identification evidence, and the like (however, as stated above, the Court Martial 
is not in fact equated to a jury trial).  
I Findings 
A finding of guilt or innocence must be the unanimous decision of the military members.78 If the 
military members are unable to arrive at a unanimous finding the Judge must discharge the jury79 and 
refer the charge back to the DMP.80 By comparison, in civilian trials, a majority verdict is permitted 
if the jury have deliberated for at least four hours.81 
The military members must obey any ruling by the Court Martial Judge on a question of law.82 If 
the military members declare a finding of guilty and "the judge is of the opinion that the finding is 
contrary to law", then the Judge must "advise the military members once (but only once) more of the 
  
76  Section 71(1); and Armed Forces Discipline Rules of Procedure, r 15(1)(h). Chapter 6 of the Manual of Armed 
Forces Law Volume 1: Commander's Handbook on Military Law, above n 11, sets out the rules of evidence 
which apply in summary proceedings. The ordinary rules of evidence do not apply in summary proceedings: 
Armed Forces Discipline Rules of Procedure, r 15(i). 
77  Under s 70(2) of the CMA the provisions of the Evidence Act which do apply include: s 32(2)(b) (no inference 
from pre-trial silence); s 45(3)(e) (record of visual identification parade); s 45(3)(f) (recording of pictorial 
identification); s 76 (prohibition on giving evidence of deliberations of jury); s 83(1) (ordinary manner of 
giving evidence); s 98(5)(a) (further evidence after close of case); s 105(1)(b) alternative ways of giving 
evidence); s 109(2) (giving evidence by undercover police officer); s 121(2) (unnecessary to warn jury of 
dangers of corroboration); and s 122–127 (warnings regarding unreliable evidence, ways of offering evidence, 
evidence of lies, evidence of children and delay). Other provisions of the Evidence Act could apply if they 
"relate to a trial before a jury" (s 70(1)). 
78  CMA, ss 55(1) and 48(1). The judge does not participate in the determination of guilt or innocence: see Armed 
Forces Discipline Rules of Procedure, r 108. 
79  CMA, s 48(1). The Act does not specify any period that must elapse before the judge can discharge the 
members. 
80  CMA, s 55(2). 
81  Juries Act, s 29C. A majority verdict means, where the jury consists of a certain number, a verdict agreed to 
by all except one juror. A majority verdict could thus be 11/12 or 10/11 or 9/10. 
82  CMA, s 44(3). 
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findings that are, in the judge's opinion, open to them in law".83 This means that even if the Judge 
concludes that the finding of guilt represents an error, he or she cannot take any further action. By 
comparison, in a civilian trial, the Judge can dismiss a charge if the Judge is satisfied that, as a matter 
of law, a properly directed jury could not reasonably convict the accused.84 In this situation, the 
alleged error by the military members could be challenged on appeal, as discussed below.85 
J Sentencing 
The Sentencing Act does not, in general, apply to proceedings under the AFDA, nor to appeals 
under the Act (except where otherwise stated).86 The only provisions of the Sentencing Act that 
explicitly apply to proceedings in the Court Martial and to appeals from the Court are s 6 (penal 
enactments not to have retrospective effect to the disadvantage of the offender) and ss 102–114 
(sentencing for murder). 
In general, the CMA and the AFDA contain the key principles and laws regarding sentencing of 
persons found guilty following a Court Martial. The only available sentences are those set out in sch 
2 of the AFDA.87 Two of these sentences are available under the Sentencing Act (imprisonment and 
fine) but the remainder are limited to military offences. The AFDA also contains sub-rules regarding 
the imposition of particular sentences.88 For example, if an officer is sentenced to a term of 
  
83  CMA, s 30(2)(h). However, at the close of the prosecution case, the Judge can rule on a "no case" submission: 
see r 102 of the Armed Forces Discipline Rules of Procedure. See also Smith v R (1977) 1 NZCMAR 60 
(CMAC). 
84  Criminal Procedure Act, s 147(4)(c). Prior to the Criminal Procedure Act, s 347(3) of the Crimes Act enabled 
a judge to direct the jury to discharge the accused. Section 347 has since been repealed and replaced by s 147. 
85  That is, by arguing that the decision is "unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence": 
CMAA, s 9A.  
86  Sentencing Act 2002, s 5(2) states "[t]his Act does not apply to proceedings under the Armed Forces 
Discipline Act 1971, or to proceedings on appeal from any decision under that Act, except as expressly 
provided in that Act." However, s 63(1)(c) of the CMA refers to s 10(1)(b)(d) and (e) of the Sentencing Act. 
87  These are imprisonment, dismissal, detention, reduction in rank, forfeiture of seniority, stay of seniority, fine, 
severe reprimand and a reprimand. The court can also order payments for compensation or restitution: AFDA, 
ss 86–87. Punishments for summary matters are limited to sch 2 of the Armed Forces Discipline Rules, r 
15(1)(f). The Armed Forces Discipline Regulations also sets out rules regarding punishments: pt 1. 
88  For example, if a person is liable on conviction to a sentence of life imprisonment or for any other term, the 
court may impose a shorter term which, in the case of a person liable to life imprisonment, shall not exceed 
14 years or to one or more of the less severe punishments in sch 2 (s 80). Further, no officer can be sentenced 
to detention (s 80(2)).  
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imprisonment, then he or she is deemed to be dismissed from Her Majesty's Service.89 Another 
example is that the maximum period of detention is two years.90 
The sentence of the Court is decided by a majority decision of the military members and the Judge 
voting together.91 If the votes are equal, the Judge has the casting vote.92 This is another significant 
difference between the military system and the civilian system. In the civilian system, once the fact 
finders (jury) have completed their role, they return home and have no further involvement in the 
proceedings. Sentencing is purely a matter for the Judge. Having the fact finders (military members) 
decide on the sentence is again, a feature of the inquisitorial system. This role of the military members 
reflects a properly grounded sentiment that military members are acutely aware of the distinct 
consequences of the various "military" sentences that can be imposed, whereas this does not apply in 
the civilian context.93 
Crucially, when sentencing, the Court is required to take into account any applicable sentencing 
guideline, issued by the Armed Forces Discipline Committee (the Discipline Committee).94 The 
Discipline Committee consists of the Chief of Defence Force, Vice-Chief of Defence Force, Chief of 
Navy, Chief of Army, Chief of Air Force, Commander Joint Forces New Zealand, the Judge Advocate 
General, the DMP and a representative of the Armed Forces Defence Counsel Panel.95 One of the 
functions of the Discipline Committee is to produce guidelines in respect of sentencing principles, 
sentencing levels, particular types of sentences, other matters relating to sentences, grounds for 
departing from the guidelines and any incidental functions.96 
In performing its functions, the Discipline Committee must ensure that any guidelines it produces 
are, to the extent that it is applicable, consistent with the Sentencing Act.97 Through this type of 
mechanism, the military justice system has adapted features of the civilian system.  
  
89  Section 82(1). 
90  Section 83. Military members are able to utilise their collective knowledge of service discipline and facts 
relating to day-to-day activities and customs of the Armed Forces: R v Main (1962) 1 NZCMAR 30 (CMAC) 
at 31. 
91  CMA, s 61(1); and Armed Forces Discipline Regulations, r 118. 
92  CMA, s 61(2). 
93  Griggs notes that the requirement for discipline in the armed forces is critical and the military members bring 
with them experience in the exercise of judgment by officers: Griggs, above n 9, at 291–301. Discipline is a 
key aspect of military sentencing.  
94  CMA, s 65. 
95  AFDA, s 160. 
96  AFDA, s 161. 
97  AFDA, s 162(2). 
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The role of the Discipline Committee is analogous to the role of the Court of Appeal in producing 
sentencing guidelines for the civilian courts.98 Just as Court of Appeal Judges are considered experts 
in determining appropriate sentences for civilian offences, members of the Discipline Committee are 
considered to have expertise in determining sentences for military offences. In both cases, the 
guidelines enhance consistency in sentencing, which is a most laudable goal. 
The Court Martial can only impose one sentence, even where there are multiple offences 
charged.99 This avoids the complexities that can arise in the civilian system from orders for 
concurrency and cumulation. By comparison, a civilian court can impose multiple sentences for 
multiple offences.100 
Further, the Court Martial does not set a non-parole period or minimum term if a sentence of 
imprisonment is imposed. This is not surprising because if a non-parole period were set, the military 
justice system would have to have a system of parole in place, with associated parole officers and the 
like. Not setting a minimum term may appear potentially unfair in that the prisoner would, prima 
facie, be required to serve the full term imposed. However, a mechanism is in place to permit a 
prisoner to be released before the expiry of the full sentence of imprisonment. This is the key role of 
the Reconsidering Authority, as discussed below. (Instead of passing a sentence, the Court has a 
discretion to order the offender to appear for sentence if called upon, within a nominated period, not 
to exceed one year.)101  
K The Reconsidering Authority 
Section 151(1) of the AFDA establishes a Reconsidering Authority. The idea of such a body is 
not new. Three types of reconsidering authorities were provided for in 1971.102 The Authority consists 
of a judge appointed by the Chief Judge and two or more superior commanders appointed by the Judge 
Advocate.103 The functions of the Authority are to "reconsider every sentence of imprisonment or 
  
98  Guidelines produced by the Court of Appeal are not pursuant to statutory provisions but rather pursuant to the 
inherent powers and role of the Court of Appeal in the performance of its function of determining criminal 
appeals. For a detailed discussion of the development of guideline judgments by the Court of Appeal see R v 
AM [2010] NZCA 114, [2010] 2 NZLR 750. 
99  AFDA, s 79. 
100  Within the constraints of the principle of totality: see Sentencing Act, s 85(2); and Robson v R [2015] NZCA 
609. 
101  CMA, s 62. If the offender is subsequently convicted of further offences, then the DMP can apply to have the 
offender brought before the Court to be dealt with for the original offence. In the civilian system, under the 
Sentencing Act, s 11, an offender can be discharged or called upon to come up for sentence at a future date. 
102  AFDA, s 166. In 1971, the reconsidering authorities could be a board of officers, or an officer appointed by 
the Chief of Staff. The purpose of the authority was to reconsider sentences of imprisonment and detention 
passed by a Court Martial, but only after the sentence had been reviewed by a "reviewing authority". 
103  AFDA, s 151(2). 
 A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE NEW ZEALAND MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE CIVILIAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 497 
detention imposed by the Court Martial that is for a term of 6 months or more".104 The Authority 
"may" reconsider any other sentence imposed by the Court Martial. The Authority must reconsider 
each sentence of imprisonment or detention at least once every six months while the sentence is being 
served.105 Clearly, this function of the Authority does not involve any appeal. 
In addition, a service prisoner can lodge a petition against his or her sentence with the 
Authority.106 The Authority must consider every petition it receives. If the Authority remits all or part 
of a sentence, it must not make a decision that results in a more severe sentence than that imposed 
before the remission.107 
The Military Justice Legislation Amendment Act introduced new rights for crime victims. The 
Reconsidering Authority must advise the victim of reconsideration (new s 155(1A)), the victim can 
make submissions to the Authority (new s 155(1B)), if a hearing is to be held the Authority must 
advise the DMP and the victim (new s 155(3), the victim is entitled to appear and make submissions 
(new s 155(3A)) and a new set of victims' rights is provided in new pt 10A (ss 198A–198O). 
L Early Release 
As stated above, the Parole Act 2002 does not apply to sentences within the military, and the Court 
Martial does not set a "non-parole" period or a "minimum term". It is therefore important for the 
military to have some system in place whereby the sentence imposed can be reviewed by a non-
judicial body, in order to determine when the prisoner might be released prior to the expiry of the full 
sentence imposed by the Court Martial.108  
If the Authority is to reconsider a sentence or detention, it must give the prisoner 14 days' notice 
and the prisoner may request a hearing before the Authority and be legally represented.109 If the 
prisoner requests a hearing, then the DMP must be notified and he or she may attend the hearing.110 
If the prisoner does not request a hearing, the reconsideration of the sentence or detention takes place 
"on the papers".111 
  
104  AFDA, s 152(1)(a). 
105  AFDA, s 152. 
106  AFDA, ss 152–153; and pt 5 of Armed Forces Discipline Regulations, ss 141–142 (form 7 is used).  
107  AFDA, s 154(2). 
108  If a court does not set a minimum term, then either a statute can prescribe a minimum term or, a non-judicial 
body can be empowered to determine the early release of a prisoner. 
109  AFDA, ss 152 and 155(1). 
110  AFDA, ss 152 and 155(3). 
111  This is similar to the power of the Court of Appeal to determine a sentence appeal on the papers: Criminal 
Procedure Act, s 329 and Court of Appeal (Criminal) Rules, r 23. Also similar to the power of a civilian court 
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The Authority may call for any written reports, and can hear evidence if a hearing is held.112 
These reports and evidence concern the circumstances of the prisoner. The Authority may remit the 
whole or part of the sentence that remains to be served, on the grounds of: 
(a) good conduct of the prisoner or detainee during the term of the sentence; 
(b) compassionate grounds; or 
(c) any other grounds.113 
The term "remit" here does not mean the sentence is sent back to the sentencing court but rather, that 
the remitted part of the sentence is waived and does not need to served. 
The sentence imposed by the Court Martial is unaffected and remains on the military records. The 
early release of a prisoner pursuant to an order for remission by the Reconsidering Authority is 
analogous to the automatic setting of a minimum term pursuant to s 84(1) of the Parole Act (for 
sentences of 24 months or more).114 
In determining release in the civilian parole system, one of the key considerations is the behaviour 
of the prisoner whilst in custody and any significant changes in the general circumstances of the 
prisoner. This equally applies in the military system. 
The right of a prisoner to petition the Authority is a form of appeal, although a right to petition is 
different from a statutory right to appeal or apply for leave to appeal.  
In summary, it can be seen that the modern Court Martial is sui generis, sharing some features of 
civilian appeal courts but also having distinct features of its own. Despite the appearance of rigid 
adherence to codes of discipline, the military justice system has a number of "safety nets" to temper 
what otherwise could be harsh consequences.    
III PART II: APPEALS FROM THE COURT MARTIAL 
All of the key decisions made in the Court Martial can be appealed. Unlike the civilian appellate 
jurisdiction, the court martial system does not have a system of discrete "appeal paths". Instead, the 
first appeal court is the Court Martial Appeal Court (CMAC). Subsequent applications for leave to 
  
to consider "on the papers" an application for a retrial or a rehearing under the Criminal Procedure Act, ss 125 
and 177: see s 125(6). 
112  AFDA, s 156. Similar to the function and role of the Parole Board, except the sentencing court determines the 
non-parole period. 
113  AFDA, s 158. 
114  Under s 84(1) of the Parole Act, a non-parole period of one third the sentence will apply for a long term 
determinate sentence if the Court has not set a minimum term. A long term determinate sentence is a sentence 
of 24 months or more. Under s 86(1) of the Parole Act, the statutory release date for a short term determinate 
sentence is the date the prisoner has served one half of the sentence. The sentencing Court is empowered to 
override these statutory minimum periods if the Court thinks fit. 
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appeal a decision of the CMAC can be made to either the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court. The 
same strict statutory pre-requisites for an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal or the 
Supreme Court apply to appeals from decisions of the CMAC as they do to appeals in the civilian 
system. The right to appeal a decision of the Court Martial is not found in the CMA but rather in the 
CMAA. 
A The Court Martial Appeal Court (CMAC) 
The CMAC of New Zealand was established pursuant to s 3(1) of the CMAA. In 1953 the CMAC 
(then known as the Courts-Martial Appeal Court) was established, some eight years after persons 
convicted in the civilian criminal courts were given a statutory right to appeal convictions and 
sentences from proceedings upon indictment.115 The CMAA was based upon, and is almost identical 
to, the Courts–Martial (Appeals) Act 1951 (UK).The English Act was preceded by a plethora of 
governmental committees of inquiry and other reports as to whether such an appellate body was 
required.116  
The Judges of the CMAC are Judges of the High Court; and such other persons being barristers 
of the High Court (who have held a practising certificate for at least seven years) or former Judges of 
the High Court.117 The CMAC is an independent civilian court, although clearly an integral 
component of the overall military appellate justice system. 
For the purpose of hearing and determining appeals, the CMAC is "summoned in accordance with 
directions given by the Chief High Court Judge" and is duly constituted if the Court consists of an 
uneven number of judges, not being less than three, and at least one of the judges is a High Court 
Judge and one is an appointed judge.118 
B Jurisdiction 
The following decisions made by a Judge of the Court Martial can be appealed or be the subject 
of an application for leave:  
(a) a bail decision; 
(b) a ruling on a question of law; 
  
115  Criminal Appeal Act 1945. Although various forms of civilian appeal against conviction and sentence were 
available prior to 1945, the Criminal Appeal Act permitted, for the first time, an appeal based on error of fact, 
error of law, or a combination of both, from proceedings on indictment. In 1991, the requirement of leave for 
a conviction and sentence appeal was removed by the Crimes Amendment Act 1991. 
116  The committees of inquiry began in 1919 with the Darling Committee reviewing Court-Martials in the Army 
and Navy, followed by the Oliver Committee in 1938, the Lewis Committee in 1946, the Pilcher Committee 
in 1949 and the Napier Committee in 1950: see Hook, above n 20, at 46–48. 
117  CMAA, s 3(1)(b). 
118  CMAA, s 4(1). 
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(c) a conviction and sentence;  
(d) an acquittal based on a finding of insanity; and 
(e) a finding of unfitness to stand trial. 
In addition, the Judge Advocate General and the Minister of Defence can refer a "finding" or other 
decision to the CMAC, as discussed below.119 
These appeal rights essentially mirror those recognised in the civilian justice system.120 For the 
purposes of this article, the right to appeal a conviction, sentence and a ruling will be discussed, 
comparing and contrasting the civilian equivalent rights. 
C Conviction Appeal 
Section 9(1) of the CMAA provides for a right to appeal a conviction.121 The appeal is of right; 
leave is not required. This is in accordance with s 25(h) of the NZBORA. A person who pleaded guilty 
can appeal the conviction.122 
Section 9A of the CMAA provides: 
(1)  On an appeal to the court against conviction, the court must— 
(a)  allow the appeal if it considers that— 
(i) the finding of the Court Martial should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable 
or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence; or 
(ii) the finding of the Court Martial involves a wrong decision on a question of law; or 
(iii) there was, on any ground, a miscarriage of justice; or 
(iv) the trial was a nullity; or 
(b)  dismiss the appeal in any other case. 
(2)  However, the court may dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice 
has actually occurred even though it considers that the point raised in the appeal might be decided 
in favour of the appellant. 
  
119  CMAA, s 24. 
120  When the Court Martial Appeal Court (CMAC) was first established in 1953, only a right to apply for leave 
to appeal a conviction was recognised. In 1959, an amendment to the CMAA permitted an appeal against a 
conviction as of right where the sentence exceeded 90 days. An appeal against a sentence was not recognised. 
121  The equivalent civilian right is in s 229(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. Under s 229(1), leave is not required. 
122  Although s 9 of the CMAA does not provide that a person who pleaded guilty can appeal a conviction, it is 
clear from civilian law that such a right exists (Criminal Procedure Act s 232(5)). However, an appeal court 
would only permit an appeal where the circumstances are exceptional. See for example Abraham v District 
Court at Auckland [2007] NZCA 598, [2008] 2 NZLR 352; and R v Merrilees [2009] NZCA 59 at [4]. Where 
the defendant has pleaded guilty, the ground of appeal will be that a miscarriage of justice has occurred.  
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Section 9A of the CMAA is different from its civilian counterpart in s 232 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act. Section 9A is based on s 385(1) of the Crimes Act, which in turn was based on the 
original "common form" appeal provisions in the Criminal Appeal Act 1945, s 4(1). In particular, s 
9A(2) retains the "proviso" which has been jettisoned in s 232 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
The ground that the finding is "unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the 
evidence" is analogous to the similar ground in s 232(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act.123 The 
focus here is on the elements of the particular offence, and an assessment of the facts (or assessing 
what the fact finders accepted as "facts") by the appeal court.124 
The ground that the finding involves a "wrong decision on a question of law" is not found in s 232 
of the Criminal Procedure Act.125 The focus is on legal error by the Judge presiding at the Court 
Martial. It is, however, insufficient simply to establish legal error; the error must be related to the 
eventual finding of the court. 
The ground of "a miscarriage of justice" in s 9A of the CMAA is the broadest of all the grounds 
and can encompass any of the ways in which a serious error or mistake has occurred in the trial or in 
relation to the trial. This ground is analogous to s 232(2)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act, and the 
case law concerning the meaning of s 232(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act guides the CMCA. 126 
Examples here include incompetence of trial counsel, judicial bias, irregularity concerning the fact 
finders, or lack of legal representation. 
The ground that the trial was a nullity is analogous to s 232(4)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
It will be rare for this ground to be upheld.127   
  
123  Section 232(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act has abandoned the term "cannot be supported having regard 
to the evidence" because it is superfluous and adds unnecessary complexity: see Owen v R [2007] NZSC 102, 
[2008] 2 NZLR 37 at [12]. 
124  See for example Jameson v R (1994) 1 NZCMAR 195 (CMAC), where the Court held the facts did not disclose 
the offence. Where the finding is challenged on the basis of the fact finders' assessment of the credibility of 
witnesses, then an appeal court will be very reluctant to intervene. 
125  A wrong decision on a question of law would come within the broader definition of a miscarriage of justice 
in s 232(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
126  A "miscarriage of justice" is defined in s 232(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act as meaning: 
… any error, irregularity, or occurrence in or in relation to or affecting the trial that– (a) has created 
a real risk that the outcome of the trial was affected; or (b) has resulted in an unfair trial or a trial that 
was a nullity.  
There are an unlimited number of circumstances that could constitute a miscarriage of justice. 
127  Wiley v R [2016] NZCA 28, [2016] 3 NZLR 1 at [33]. This could include where the charge is not known at 
law, or the charge is heard in the wrong court. The Criminal Procedure Act includes trial nullity as part of the 
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The most significant difference between s 9A of the CMAA and s 232 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act is the retention of what has become known as "the proviso" in the former. The effect of the proviso 
in s 9A(2) is that the CMAC can dismiss an appeal even if it is satisfied that a miscarriage of justice 
occurred, so long as the miscarriage of justice was not a "substantial" miscarriage of justice.128 If the 
appellant can demonstrate an error was made, then it is up to the prosecution (respondent) to persuade 
the appeal court that despite the error, no substantial miscarriage of justice in fact occurred. Not 
surprisingly, the proviso has been abandoned in the Criminal Procedure Act and in other 
commonwealth jurisdictions. Arguably, s 9A should also be reformed by jettisoning the proviso.    
The available orders on a successful conviction appeal are set out in s 9A(3) of the CMAA. The 
Court:129 
(a)  may quash the conviction; and 
(b)  may do any of the following: 
(i)  direct a judgment and finding of acquittal to be entered; or 
(ii)  direct a new trial; or 
(iii)  make any other order that justice requires. 
These are essentially the same orders available to a civilian appeal court.130 
D Sentence Appeal 
Pursuant to s 9(1)(b) of the CMAA, a person convicted can appeal the sentence imposed (unless 
the sentence is one fixed by law). The same right is found in s 244(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
The DMP can also appeal the sentence.131 For civilian cases, this prosecution right is also found in s 
246(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  
Prior to 2009, a sentence appeal was not available for the convicted service person and the 
prosecution had no appeal rights at all. Thus, the right to appeal sentence (without leave) has 
significantly aligned the military provisions with the civilian counterpart. 
  
definition of a miscarriage of justice, whilst the CMAA recognises it as a distinct ground of appeal separate 
from the miscarriage of justice ground. 
128  Therefore the CMAC will have to grapple with the distinction between a "miscarriage of justice" in s 
9A(1)(iii) and a "substantial miscarriage of justice" in s 9A(2). The Court may be guided by cases such as 
Matenga v R [2009] NZSC 18, [2009] 3 NZLR 145; and R v Gwaze [2010] NZSC 52, [2010] 3 NZLR 734 at 
[58]. 
129  See also Armed Forces Discipline Regulations, rr 129–130. 
130  Criminal Procedure Act, s 233. 
131  CMAA, s 9(2). 
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E General Approach to Sentence Appeals 
As a general proposition, the CMAC follows the same approach as the Court of Appeal in civilian 
sentence appeals. For example, the CMAC recognises the sentencing methodology in R v Taeuki132 
and the principles governing a discount for a guilty plea.133 
However, one notable difference is that the CMAC (and the Court Martial) will accord greater 
weight to previous decisions of a Court Martial than to previous decisions of a civilian appeal courts. 
In R v Murfitt134 the CMAC stated that some guidance on this issue could be derived from the English 
decision of R v Love where the Court stated:135 
In the present class of appeal therefore it seems to us that this Court is exercising a somewhat hybrid 
jurisdiction and that whilst free and clearly intended by Parliament to correct any injustice which we 
perceive in a court-martial sentence, we must nevertheless be mindful that those imposing and confirming 
such sentences are, generally speaking, better placed than we are when it comes to assessing the 
seriousness of offending in the context of service life, and deciding upon what particular penalty is 
required to maintain the discipline and efficiency of the armed forces.  
Here is an expression of the general principle that the CMAC should give significant weight to 
the opinion of the Judges of the Court Martial because they are more "in tune" with levels of offence 
seriousness and appropriate sentences for particular offences. Although the Court in R v Love did not 
explicitly refer to the opinion of civilian judges (for the same offences), it is clear the Court was 
suggesting that the opinion of the Court Martial Judges should, in general, be preferred. 
It is suggested that this is a significant policy position because it affects the overall doctrine of 
precedent (at least for sentence appeals), and shows how an appeal system develops and evolves to 
meet the specific needs of the parties (and institutions) involved. Moreover, the sentencing guidelines 
produced by the Armed Forces Disciplinary Committee must also be taken into account at sentencing. 
In respect of prosecution sentence appeals, the CMAC takes a similar approach to the Court of 
Appeal. In R v Murfitt, the CMAC stated that s 9 of the CMAA generally follows s 383 of the Crimes 
Act, and that the CMAC should follow the approach of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in respect 
  
132  R v Taueki [2005] NZCA 174, [2005] 3 NZLR 372, followed in R v Murfitt CMAC Wellington CIV-2010-
485-1995, 15 December 2010 at [43]. In Hessell v R [2010] NZSC 135, [2011] 1 NZLR 607 at [73] the 
Supreme Court confirmed that a three step process in sentencing is appropriate as it enhances transparency 
and accountability. In summary, the three steps are (a) determine the starting point sentence by reference to 
the objective circumstances of the offence; (b) adjust the starting point sentence by taking into account any 
mitigating or aggravating factors relating to the offender and; (c) make further adjustment for any guilty plea 
or assistance provided to the authorities.  
133  As set out in Hessell v R, above n 132, at [14] and [22]–[23], followed in R v Murfitt, above n 132, at [43].  
134  R v Murfitt, above n 132, at [30]; and R v Love (1998) 1 CR App R 458 (CMAC). 
135  R v Love, above n 134, at 462, as cited in R v Murfitt, above n 132, at [30]. 
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of prosecution sentence appeals.136 Specifically, the Court should not increase a sentence unless 
persuaded the sentence is "manifestly inadequate" or the Crown can point to some error of principle 
in the sentence.137 Further, if an error occurred in the original sentence, and that error was caused by 
the prosecutor, then, on a prosecution appeal, the prosecution are not permitted to rely on that error 
as a ground to increase the sentence.138 
F Determination of Sentence Appeal 
In terms of the grounds for upholding a sentence appeal, s 9AB of the CMAA provides that the 
CMAC must:139 
(a)  do either of the following if it thinks that a different sentence should have been imposed: 
(i) quash the sentence imposed and impose any other sentence warranted in law (whether more 
or less severe) in substitution for the sentence that was quashed; or 
(ii) vary, within the limits warranted in law, the sentence or any part of it or any condition 
imposed in it; or 
(b)  dismiss the appeal in any other case.  
Section 9AB is different to the civilian counterpart in s 250(2) Criminal Procedure Act because it 
conflates the criteria for upholding the appeal with the disposition options. Under s 9AB, the CMAC 
cannot impose any orders unless it is first satisfied "that a different sentence should have been 
imposed".  In the civilian context, what this means is not simply that the appeal court might have 
arrived at a different sentence. Nor is it sufficient that there is any type of error. The error must be 
substantial or material, such as to justify quashing the sentence.140 
The disposition options in s 9AB are essentially the same as in s 251 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act, except the CMAC has no power to remit the sentence back to the Court Martial.141 
  
136  R v Murfitt, above n 132, at [27]. 
137  R v Murfitt, above n 132, at [27]. Prosecution appeals are not for borderline cases: R v Cargill [1990] 2 NZLR 
138 (CA) at 140. 
138  R v Murfitt, above n 132, at [52]. To do so would enable the prosecution to benefit from its own error. 
139  The equivalent provision is s 251 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  
140  Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [26], referring to R v Shipton [2007] 2 NZLR 
218 (CA) at [138]. 
141  This limitation reflects the practical realities that military proceedings are more "streamlined" than the civilian 
counterpart, and also reflects the complications associated with re-convening the original fact finders (military 
members), compared to a single trial judge resentencing the offender. The limitation probably also reflects 
the historical practice of dissolving a court martial once the proceedings were completed. 
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G Appeal Against a Ruling 
Prior to 2009, it was not possible to appeal a ruling made by the Court Martial Judge. However, 
under s 7 of the CMAA, either the accused person or the DMP can apply for leave to appeal a ruling 
on a question of law or procedure "that arises during proceedings in that court". This means the appeal 
is not brought after the proceedings have concluded. The trial must be underway, or about to get 
underway. It is clear that the Judge can also make such a ruling before the military members have 
been appointed.142 
The analogous right in the civilian context is provided for in s 296 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
Section 296 provides for a right to apply for leave to appeal on a question of law. The question of law 
must not be one that arises from a jury verdict or arose before the trial and has already been decided 
under sub-pt 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act.143 The question of law must arise in proceedings that 
"relate to or follow the determination of the charge"144 or in the determination of the charge (e.g. 
including a conviction, an acquittal or the dismissal of a charge).  
Section 7(5) of the CMAA provides examples of the type of rulings which can be appealed.145 
These examples are not exhaustive. It is clear from s 7(5) of the CMAA that the sorts of questions of 
law which can be appealed relate to preliminary matters, such as jurisdiction or procedure, rather than 
the actual determination of the proceedings such as a conviction or acquittal. Arguably, rulings on 
these types of matters could constitute pre-trial rulings, particularly if the military members have not 
yet been appointed.  
In any event, the right to appeal a ruling of the Court Martial is a significant reform because it 
radically expands the circumstances in which a decision of the Court Martial can be challenged. The 
right is particularly important for the prosecution because it enables the prosecution to salvage a 
potentially terminal prosecution. For example, assume the trial judge ruled that critical prosecution 
evidence is inadmissible. Without that evidence, the prosecution case would collapse. In the absence 
of a right to appeal the ruling, the prosecution case may well be terminated. With the right to challenge 
the ruling, if successful, the prosecution can continue. This advantage applies to all terminatory 
rulings" such as a ruling that there is no case to answer. 
  
142  CMA, s 44(2). 
143  Section 296(4). Appeals against pre-trial rulings are provided for separately in ss 215 and 217 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act. 
144  In Anderson v R [2015] NZCA 518, [2016] 2 NZLR 321 the Court of Appeal held that the decision of a trial 
judge to refuse an application to change an election for judge-alone trial, did come within the category of 
"rulings" that can be appealed on a question of law. Such a ruling was held to "relate to or follow the 
determination of the charge". 
145  For example a plea to the general jurisdiction of the court; a plea in bar of trial; an application for a separate 
trial; an application for severance of charges; and a submission that there is no case to answer. 
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The Court Martial has the discretion to continue with the trial or to await the outcome of the 
application for leave to appeal.146 This is the same general procedure in civilian cases.147 
Given that an appeal against a ruling of the Court Martial requires leave of the appeal court, the 
test and procedure for a grant of leave is important. A single Judge of the CMAC is empowered to 
hear and determine an application for leave to appeal a ruling under s 7.148 If the single Judge refuses 
to grant leave, then the applicant (either the accused person or the prosecution), upon a request to the 
CMAC, has a right to have the refusal reviewed by the Court as a whole.149 
Analogously, in the civilian context, any two Judges of the Court of Appeal can hear and 
determine an application for leave to appeal.150 If the two Judges refuse to grant leave to appeal, the 
applicant has a right to have the application reheard by the Court of Appeal.151 
In this procedural respect, the rights of military accused persons have converged with the same 
rights of their civilian counterpart.    
The CMAA does not specify any criteria for leave to appeal. Clearly, leave will not be granted if 
the proposed appeal is hopeless and has no prospects at all of success. Important guidance can be 
obtained from Practice Note – R v Leonard where the Court of Appeal sets out detailed guidance for 
deciding leave to appeal a pre-trial decision.152 This Practice Note provides guidance for all types of 
leave application. 
The Court Martial Appeal Court Rules are, in effect, a replica of the Court of Appeal (Criminal) 
Rules 2001. The important effect of this is that the appellate procedural rights of Defence Force 
members are identical to their civilian counterpart, and in this respect, military law has fully aligned 
with civilian law. 
H Subsequent Appeals 
Under s 10 of the CMAA, a party to an appeal under s 6 (bail), s 7 (ruling) or s 9 (conviction or 
sentence) may appeal (with leave of the appeal court) to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court 
against the decision of the CMAC. In practice, the Court of Appeal is likely to be the second appeal 
  
146  CMAA, s 8(3). 
147  Criminal Procedure Act, s 222. 
148  Section 25(1).  
149  CMAA, s 25(2). 
150  Criminal Procedure Act, s 333(1). 
151  Criminal Procedure Act, s 333(3). 
152  Practice Note – R v Leonard [2007] NZCA 452, [2008] 2 NZLR 218. 
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court rather than the Supreme Court because of the stringency attaching to any application for leave 
to appeal to the Supreme Court.153  
Under s 10 of the CMAA, a party to an appeal to the Court of Appeal may appeal (with leave) to 
the Supreme Court against a decision of the Court of Appeal. The procedure for a subsequent appeal 
generally follows the civilian rules for a subsequent appeal.154 
I Special References to the CMAC 
There are two circumstances when a matter can be referred to the CMAC without being an appeal 
by one of the parties. The first circumstance is that the Judge Advocate General can refer "a finding 
made, a conviction entered, or a sentence passed in any proceedings in the Court Martial", if the Judge 
Advocate General thinks it is in the interests of justice or discipline to do so.155 This is a broad and 
general power. The power would only be exercised after all appeals by the convicted person to the 
CMAC have been exhausted, or, the convicted person does not wish to appeal, or perhaps the 
convicted person has left the Armed Forces and cannot be contacted.  
The second circumstance is that the Minister of Defence may refer to the CMAC a "finding" made 
in the proceedings if the Minister thinks that the court should consider or reconsider that finding 
"because of matters that the Minister considers have not been brought to the notice of the Court 
Martial".156 This circumstance could include where fresh evidence has emerged (post-trial and post-
appeal) or where there was a failure to adduce the evidence on the initial appeal. 
These two types of references must be treated as an appeal against conviction.157 Accordingly, it 
appears that the CMAC could not decline to deal with the reference. The purpose of these two types 
  
153  Section 74(1) of the Senior Courts Act provides that the Supreme Court must not give leave to appeal unless 
the Court is satisfied "it is necessary in the interests of justice for the court to hear and determine the appeal". 
Section 74(2) then provides that it is necessary in the interests of justice for the Court to hear the appeal if (a) 
the appeal involves a matter of general or public importance; or (b) a substantial miscarriage of justice may 
have occurred or may occur unless the appeal is heard; or (c) the appeal involves a matter of general 
commercial significance. Any appeal from the CMAC would have to involve a legal issue going well beyond 
the facts of the particular case or, involve a possible miscarriage of justice. Although neither the CMA nor the 
CMAA recognises the right of a party to appeal directly to the Supreme Court from the Court Martial, s 75 of 
the Senior Courts Act requires that the Supreme Court must not give leave for such an appeal (apart from an 
appeal from the Court of Appeal) unless satisfied there are "exceptional circumstances" to justify the appeal.  
154  That is, the application for leave must be made within 28 days of the decision under appeal (or within extra 
time, if granted) and in the manner prescribed by the rules of the court appealed to: CMAA, s 10(3). 
155  CMAA, s 24(1). See for example Re Leading Aircraftman F [1998] 1 NZLR 714 (CMAC). 
156  CMAA, s 24(2). A finding includes a judgment, decree, order, direction or determination: s 24(4). 
157  CMAA, s 24. The Registrar must notify the person who is the subject of the reference by providing a copy of 
the notice, and asking if he or she desires to have legal representation at any oral hearing: s 24A(1). 
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of referrals is to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice from occurring, or to address a disciplinary 
issue. 
These two types of references are not "appeals" in the ordinary sense of the word, but in both 
cases the Judge Advocate General and the Minister are "requesting" the CMAC to review the matter, 
and if appropriate, to quash the conviction and make other orders. These references are not in any way 
connected to the prerogative of mercy. Nothing in the CMAA affects the royal prerogative of 
mercy.158 
There are no equivalent provisions in the civilian appeal system. The closest is s 406 of the Crimes 
Act. Under this section, where the Governor-General has received an application by a person for the 
exercise of the royal prerogative of mercy (in relation to a conviction or sentence), the Governor-
General can either (a) refer the conviction or sentence to the Court of Appeal, and the reference shall 
be treated as an appeal against conviction or sentence by the person; or (b) can refer a specific question 
of law to the Court of Appeal to help the Governor-General with the application for mercy, and the 
Court of Appeal must provide the Governor-General with its opinion. Referrals under s 406 of the 
Crimes Act will invariably involve fresh evidence. The purpose of these two types of referrals is to 
prevent a miscarriage of justice from occurring where the convicted person has exhausted all their 
statutory appeal rights. 
The differences between who is the "referrer" in the military and civilian contexts reflects the 
distribution of responsibility for the overall administration of each sector. In the military sector, the 
Judge Advocate General is responsible for the "hands-on" administration of Court Martials and 
appeals from that court, and the Minister of Defence has political responsibility for the overall 
administration of military justice. In the civilian context, the Governor-General is the representative 
of the monarch, to whom applications for the royal prerogative of mercy are made, and hence is the 
appropriate person to refer matters to the civilian Court of Appeal. 
J Application of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
As a general proposition, the NZBORA applies to all members of the Defence Force because 
those members are New Zealand citizens. In the absence of express statutory provisions to the 
contrary, members of the Defence Force possess the same civil and political rights as persons who are 
not members of the Armed Forces. Having said this, there are circumstances where some rights in the 
NZBORA will not apply to service members, or, where the interpretation and application of those 
rights will be different for service members, compared to ordinary civilians.  
There are several provisions in the NZBORA which specifically do not apply in the military 
context. As already discussed, where a member has elected for summary trial or to be otherwise dealt 
with summarily, then the accused does not have the right to legal representation, which he or she 
  
158  CMAA, s 27. The references could be made either before or after an application for the prerogative of mercy. 
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would otherwise have under s 24(c) of the NZBORA.159 Similarly, where the member has elected to 
be dealt with summarily, he or she does not have the right to a hearing by an independent and impartial 
court which he or she would otherwise have under s 25(a) of the NZBORA.160 The removal of these 
rights under the NZBORA is not unconstitutional because Parliament is empowered to simply 
override any provisions in the NZBORA.161 Further, the removal of these rights will probably come 
within s 5 of the NZBORA which permits "reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society".  
A final example of the exclusion of application of the NZBORA is s 24(e) of the NZBORA which 
states that everyone charged with an offence: 
… shall have the right, except in the case of an offence under military law tried before a military tribunal, 
to the benefit of a trial by jury when the penalty for the offence is or includes imprisonment for 2 years or 
more … 
In terms of how particular rights in the NZBORA apply to service members, two cases in 
particular have suggested a general approach. In Froggatt v R, the accused was charged with a number 
of drug and burglary offences.162 The military police had attended the home of the accused who later 
attended the military police complex where he made a number of damaging admissions. At trial, the 
defendant argued that his right to consult and instruct a lawyer was breached because he had been 
arrested and detained. That right is found in s 23(1)(b) of the NZBORA. On appeal against the 
conviction, the CMAC firstly held the Court is not required to determine if the NZBORA applied to 
proceedings under the AFDA as the parties had not made submissions on this issue. 
The Court held that the appellant had not been under arrest at any stage and had not been 
"detained" at the police complex. The Court stated that just because a soldier is ordered to attend a 
particular place, does not mean he or she is thereby under arrest:163 
… we do not think that the Legislature intended that the Bill of Rights should inhibit or erode the power 
of command and obedience to orders which are fundamental to the control and operation of our armed 
forces.  
  
159  AFDA, ss 117ZB(2)(a) and 117ZD; and Armed Forces Discipline Regulations, r 15(c)(d).  
160  Armed Forces Discipline Regulations, r 15(1)(a)(b); and AFDA, ss 117ZB(2)(b) and 117ZD. The disciplinary 
officer who determines the matter may be closely connected to the accused and may have personal knowledge 
of the alleged offence and the investigation. For a detailed discussion of the principles relating to judicial bias 
see the judgment of Fisher J in Lawrence v R (2001) 1 NZCMAR 414 (CMAC) at [45]–[58]. 
161  NZBORA is not a supreme or entrenched statute.  
162  Froggatt v R, above n 17. 
163  At 20. 
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The Court held there had not been a breach of s 23(1)(b) of the NZBORA. Implicit in this 
judgment is the important role of discipline within the Armed Forces and the duty of the service 
member to obey all lawful directions and orders. Arguably, if the circumstances were civilian in 
nature, a different result might have ensued.  
In R v Jack, military "regulators" (investigators) searched a number of on shore military 
accommodation facilities, searching for the accused.164 Upon entering the accused's cabin, the 
investigators observed and seized evidence relating to drugs (cannabis pipe and cannabis plant). The 
appellant was convicted of drug related offences. On appeal, the appellant argued that his right to be 
protected from "unreasonable search or seizure" under s 21 of the NZBORA had been breached by 
unreasonable and unlawful searches, and, as a consequence, the evidence obtained by the search 
should be ruled inadmissible. 
The CMAC held that the appellant's s 21 right had not been breached, and the actions of the 
regulators were not unlawful or unreasonable. The entry of the cabin by the investigators was not a 
"search" but merely a normal incidence in the undertaking by the regulators of their daily duties:165 
The quality of privacy applying to the private home of a serviceman may well be equivalent to the quality 
of privacy attaching to a citizen in his private home. However, the quality of privacy attaching to the 
accommodation facility in a defence establishment, in respect of an enlisted serviceman, is quite different 
to that of a citizen or an enlisted serviceman in his own home… 
The Court also discussed the scope of "customary powers" under s 97 of the AFDA under which 
a whole range of non-statutory investigatory and disciplinary actions are available. These include a 
power to search and seize. 
Importantly, the Court stated that the NZBORA did apply to proceedings under the AFDA. 166 
The protection against "unreasonable searches" applied to all persons, including members of the 
military services. However, the search was not unreasonable and the appeal was dismissed:167 
Accordingly, the circumstances in which a search might be held to be unreasonable in the civilian context 
may not necessarily be held to be unreasonable in the context of service in the armed forces. 
  
  
164  R v Jack [1999] 3 NZLR 331 (NZCMAC). 
165  At 336. 
166  At 339. 
167  At 339. 
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And:168 
We conclude that although the NZBORA has a place in the law relating to armed forces discipline, the 
proper exercise of powers arising from statute, or preserved in relation to service custom, will not 
ordinarily create circumstances in which the NZBORA can be pleaded.  
In Van der Ent v Sewell, the applicant applied for a writ of habeas corpus.169 The applicant had 
been detained and a court martial was due to be held in approximately two weeks. McGechan J refused 
the application for habeas corpus170 but considered the issue of whether the applicant could be 
released on bail pending the court martial. McGechan J referred to s 24(b) of the NZBORA and 
stated:171 
[10] I have no doubt that s 24 and that paragraph apply in relation to military disciplinary proceedings. It 
is not a question which has been decided in finite terms to this point, but all the indications so favour, not 
least those in s 24(e) which makes a specific exception in relation to jury trials for offences under military 
law tried before a military tribunal. That would hardly be necessary if s 24 did not include matters military. 
I am prepared to say the present applicant is charged with an "offence", under s 24 meaning in any event, 
and the question is whether there is "just cause" for continued detention pending a determination by 
Courts-Martial or otherwise of the alleged offence or offences.  
In deciding whether there was just cause for release, McGechan J stated that "due regard, and it 
should be anxious regard, must be paid to the military context and the need to maintain discipline 
within military forces. It is a special situation."172 His Honour granted bail upon conditions. 
This is an important case because it shows a civilian judge grappling with a bail decision in the 
special circumstances of the applicant facing a forthcoming Court Martial. McGechan J relied on the 
NZBORA rather than bail laws, or any provision in the AFDA, to grant bail.   
K Discussion 
What does the above comparison show? It is suggested that it shows three things. First, although 
the principal civilian criminal justice statutes do not apply to the military system, the Court Martial 
  
168  At 340 
169  Van der Ent v Sewell [2000] 3 NZLR 125 (HC). 
170  On the grounds that the application was more suitable for judicial review as it challenged the exercise of a 
discretion (by the Chief of Defence Force under s 52(3)(b) of the Defence Act), rather than directly 
challenging the lawfulness of the detention [5]–[8]. His Honour hinted that if judicial review was to 
commence, an important factor to be taken into account was "discretionary factors relating to interference 
with the discharge of armed forces disciplinary procedures" (at [6]). 
171  Van der Ent v Sewell, above n 169. 
172  At [11]. 
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and the CMAC apply the same general approaches and principles as those found in the civilian 
statutes. This can be seen in terms of rules of evidence, procedure, sentencing and bail. The civilian 
laws have been adopted and adapted. 
Second, the comparison also shows that the right to appeal various decisions of the Court Martial 
are essentially the same as equivalent rights in the civilian system. The procedure for appeals to the 
CMAC (Court Martial Appeal Court Rules) are virtually identical to those applicable in the Court of 
Appeal (Court of Appeal (Criminal) Rules). Again, civilian laws have been adopted and adapted. The 
major differences between the two appellate systems is that (in respect to conviction appeals) the 
CMAC retains the common form "proviso" and (in respect to sentence appeals) lacks a power to remit 
a sentence back to the Court Martial. 
Thirdly, the comparison shows that whilst in general the NZBORA applies to all members of the 
Armed Forces, the way in which the NZBORA has been applied in the military context is somewhat 
different to the civilian context. These differences reflect the special obligations and responsibilities 
of members of the Armed Forces. 
Despite all of the similarities between the two systems, it is suggested that a number of 
fundamental or "core" features of the military system are unlikely to change in the near future. These 
features are: 
(i) The role of the military members as fact finders differs from the civilian jury in several key 
respects. First, the military members are not truly "impartial" in the sense that each military 
member brings with him or her a deep understanding of the relative seriousness of particular 
offences, the importance of discipline within the Armed Forces and an ability to judge the 
liability of the accused person in the broader military context. Indeed, these attributes are 
seen as strengths of the military member system. Secondly, the military members, with the 
judge, determine an appropriate sentence, again, informed by an understanding of what 
would constitute an appropriate and proportionate sentence. Thirdly, only three or five 
members are required for a trial. It is unlikely that any of these characteristics will change in 
the near future; 
(ii) In general, none of the key civilian statutes apply to proceedings in the Court Martial or the 
CMAC. Instead, the military system has its own set of statutes which set out substantive law, 
procedural law and sentencing law. In this sense the governing legislation for military trials 
and appeals is sui generis and again, it is unlikely that this will change in the near future; 
(iii) When imposing a term of imprisonment, the Court Martial does not set minimum terms of 
imprisonment or non-parole periods. Civilian sentencing courts can also decline to set a 
minimum term or non-parole period. However, in the civilian system, statutory minimum 
periods are set whilst in the military system, this is a matter of discretion for the 
Reconsidering Authority; and  
(iv) The NZBORA does not apply to members of the Armed Forces in the same way as it applies 
to civilians. 
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These fundamental differences reflect the different histories of the two systems and the different 
needs of the relevant institutions and personnel. The seven key principles identified in the introduction 
(maintenance of discipline, consistency, portability, expedition, fairness, efficiency and simplicity) 
remain the key drivers of the military criminal justice system. 
L Conclusion 
There is a clear pattern whereby the military justice system is adopting and adapting more and 
more features of the civilian justice system, where this is appropriate.173 In this sense the military and 
civilian systems are becoming aligned. For the future, however, the overall legal framework for the 
administration of military criminal justice is unlikely to change, and indeed there is no assumption 
that it should change. The civilian criminal justice system is not exactly immune from criticism. The 
military justice system has developed, and will continue to evolve, to meet the specific needs of the 
institutions and personnel affected, just as the civilian system has developed and will continue to 
evolve to meet the needs of its institutions and persons involved. 
  
  
173  As already mentioned, the Military Justice Legislation Amendment Act further develops this alignment 
process by attempting to ensure that the victims of crime in military offences have the same rights as civilian 
victims; that the military procedures for determining fitness to stand trial are consistent with the provisions of 
the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act; that prosecution rights to object to appointment of 
military members are expanded; and that changes are made to the onus of proof. The military system does 
already accord victims of crime a range of rights: see Manual of Armed Forces Law Volume 1: Commander's 
Handbook on Military Law, above n 11, s 7. 
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